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1 Introduction
Social choice theory is concerned with aggregating individual reports on their desires over alternative states
of the world in order to make a collective decision. What this involves, essentially, is squashing a lot of
information living in a high dimension into a single dimension in order to rank the alternatives. Although
choice theory is now well established, and there isn’t much new to say, there is some value in looking at this
squashing process from an unfamiliar angle. This is the aim of this paper.
The choice problem will be studied in this paper by treating the domain over which an ordering is to be
made as the utility reports of individuals treated as an n dimensional Euclidean space with the reports of any
one individual thought of as numbers on a line. This domain of information differs significantly from that in
the tradition of Arrow which looks at choice over the ranking that individuals have for various states of the
world. In this case the impossibility theorem shows that there is no aggregation procedure that can satisfy a
small number of reasonable conditions such as: unrestricted domain of preferences; transitivity; selection of the
unanimously preferred outcome; and no dictatorship. Looking at choice over the domain of utilities shifts the
emphasis from impossibility theorems to questions about the existence, and characteristics of, the mappings
given by choice functions under different information conditions. In addition we can use some familiar tools
from calculus and analysis.
The specific purpose of the paper is to exploit these tools to develop some simple and constructive proofs
of the conditions under which choice is possible and to study the character of the rankings produced by an
acceptable choice function.
Sen and Roberts have also studied choice over the domain of utility reports and many of the results reported
here are familiar from their work.1 This paper derives its results in a more straightforward manner and also
give information on the way in which all states of the world, on any path through the set of states of the
world, must be ordered. This resolves the indeterminacy left by concepts like Pareto efficiency. This has the
advantage of giving a better picture of the underlying spatial structure of choice than Arrow’s more familiar
combinatorical approach.2 A further advantage of using with utility reports is that it allows questions to be
asked about welfare implications of collective decisions.
I follow Sen in calling the mapping from the space of utility functions to an ordering a social welfare func-
tional, or simply a welfare function.
I set out the main geometrical insights in section 2 and the results on the properties of the welfare functions
1Sen ([?], 1111-12) gives an excellent summary and an extensive bibliography of this and other interpretations of the choice
problem in the period up to 1986. The only notable work that is not extensively covered is the topological approach of Chichilnisky
and Heal [?], [?], [?] and recent work by Saari [?] that explores the geometry of choice with ordinal information structures. See
also [?]
2When the combinatoric proof of Arrow’s theorem has been put on the board for undergraduates it is never clear what has
been explained or what is happening to the space of reports under the choice mapping. For spatial intuition for ordinal data see
the work by Saari [?].
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that satisfy various conditions in section 3.
2 The social choice function and information equivalence.
The social choice and welfare functions are defined and, in Proposition 2, some a spatial representation is
developed about the way in which the welfare function maps the n dimensional space of utility reports. This
says, roughly, that the welfare function gives the same ranking to all points on hypersurfaces of dimension
n − 1 in this space. These surfaces cut across the space in a downward direction. Think of sheets of paper
slicing through a three dimensional box, for example. It follows that the welfare function maps any path of
utility reports, say a path something like a piece of string in the three dimensional box, according to the way
in which it is sliced by these sheets of paper. See fig. 1 and fig. 2.
1. The social choice function.
The social choice function is a mapping from states of the world to an ordering of those states thought of
as points on the real number line. A state of the world is written s ∈ S and is any possible combination of
allocations of goods, work, access to education and housing and whatever else might be subject to collective
decision. There are n individuals. It is assumed that the set of states of the world forms a convex set and is
restricted so that it is possible to associate with each individual i a continuous function xi : S → R. This is not
a completely innocent assumption since it essentially requires the existence of some universal, or all purpose,
good that can be exchanged for all other goods in order to provide a metric on S and to make the idea of
an arbitrarily small increase in s sensible. It is assumed that xi increases with an increase in |S| and that, if
s is preferred by i to s′ then xi(s) > xi(s′). It will be noted that the condition imposed on x does not give
a unique value for xi since, for any given xi it can be met by any continuous bounded monotonic increasing
transformation. Write the reports of the n individuals as the vector x ∈ U ⊂ Rn and the set of acceptable
transformations of x be T where T = {f : U → X ⊂ Rn}. It follows that the space of utility reports is given
by
S
x→ U T→ X
where the range of the composite T ◦ x is understood to mean the range of f(x) for all f in an acceptable T .
It will be noted that x is not a homeomorphism since it is not one-one.
The choice function ψ : S → R can be thought of as the composite function
ψ := ϕ ◦ T ◦ x→ R
where the welfare function
ϕ : X → R
is a monotonic increasing function that maps information on utilities into an ordering.
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It is assumed that X is a bounded subset of Rn. This means that xi ≤ K for each i for some K sufficiently
large. It is also assumed that the welfare function is only required to process utilities with xi ≥  for each i in
order to increase the space of welfare mappings that might be acceptable. These assumptions are only meant
to tell us something about the information that a welfare function might reasonable be required to process.
They are not necessarily a statements about the utilities that individuals might claim to have, although it is
perfectly reasonable to assume that utilities would not, in fact, become infinite.3 it is also necessary to require
that T ◦ x is finite.
It is necessary to show that the choice function is decisive, in that it can pick a finite set of top ranked
alternatives. Apart from the obvious condition that ψ is not constant this requires that it does not oscillate
rapidly. This requires that each critical point for ψ is some distance from the next.
Proposition 1. [a]. The function ψ has a maximum and a minimum on S
[b]. If ψ is differentiable critical points are isolated.
Proof. [a]. Immediate from the facts that ϕ is continuous and X is a closed and bounded subset of Rn.
[b]. Immediate from the Morse Theorem.

In what follows I will concentrate on the welfare function since it is the information contained in utility
reports that is of most interest.
2. Conditions on the welfare function.
The welfare function is required to satisfy a set of reasonable conditions to ensure that it is not arbitrary. For
the present purposes these will be taken to be the following
Ai. Continuity.
This says that the welfare function must map reports that are arbitrarily close together to rankings that are
arbitrarily close together. This seems reasonable as a consistency requirement. It is not met by voting pro-
cedures like first past the post, for example, because the choices are discontinuous, and most of the criticism
of these types of decision mechanisms can be boiled down to this fact. Segal ([?], p.575) has argued that
collective choice should be discontinuous on the grounds that things like Medicaid are not continuous. This
confuses convexity in the domain with continuity in the welfare function.
Aii. Pareto.
This says that if xi(s) ≥ xi(s′) for all i, then ϕ ◦ x(s) ≥ ϕ ◦ x(s′).
Aiii. Anonymity.
This says that the welfare function should not discriminate between individuals.4It imposes greater restrictions
3It is only necessary to assume, for example, that
|x(s)|
|s|′ → 0 as |s|′ →∞ where |x(s)| is the sup-norm.
4It is used in the topological approach, for example, but it is not used in Arrow type approaches
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on the welfare function than non-dictatorship. Even though it is not used in all social choice theorems it seems
fundamental It means that for s and s′ states of the world and δ a permutation such that δx(s) = x(s′) then
ϕ ◦ x(s) = ϕ ◦ x(s′)
Aiv. Differentiability.
This is required to keep the proofs simple and has already been used in the proof of Proposition 1. Since
the set of differentiable functions is dense in the space of continuous functions on Rn, any non-differentiable
function can be approximated as closely as we wish by a differentiable function.5
3. Some general properties of the welfare function.
The mapping produced by the welfare function can be understood if we know which sets of points in the space
of utility reports are given the same rank. These are given by ϕ−1 := {x : ϕ(x) = k} for k some constant. See
fig. 1 for an example in R3.
Figure 1. Example of the set {x : ϕ(x) = k} in R3.
Proposition. 2.The welfare function has sets ϕ−1(k) for each k ∈ R with the properties that:
[a]. each set ϕ−1(k) is a manifold, or hypersurface, of dimension n− 1 in Rn for almost all points k ∈ R
[b] there is only one set for each k : ϕ(x) = k and each such set is intersected by the diagonal in the space Rn
given by the ray σ through the points f(0) and (f(K), f(K), . . . , f(K)).
[c]. ∂xi∂xj = −1 in the direction xj at any point c ∈ σ.
Proof. [a]. This follows immediately from Sard’s theorem.
[b]. Aii says that the partial derivatives of the sets x ∈ ϕ−1(k) must be less than or equal to zero always and
uniqueness follows from the continuity of ϕ. Intersection with σ follows from Aiii.
[c]. From the mean value theorem and the implicit function theorem ∂xi∂xj = −1 evaluated at points ci, cj and
it is possible to use a squeezing argument from both sides of the diagonal to get ci = cj .

In practical terms this proposition tells us that we can neglect points where ϕ−1(k) is not a manifold when
thinking about the space of utility reports. This proposition is illustrated in fig. 2 where X is a circle, or
5From the theory by Hilbert that the polynomials are dense in a cube [?], or by or approximating ϕ with an integral. Since
the domain is Rn/0 any first degree differentiable function is differentiable to any order.
4
closed loop, in R2. What is somewhat less obvious than this diagram suggests is that any welfare function
from almost any loop in Rn that encloses a convex space will produce a mapping in R with the two critical
values.6
Figure 2. Example of ϕ(θ) for θ a closed loop.
In addition to satisfying Ai − Aiii the choice function must always rank states of the world in the same
order under all acceptable transformations. It is easy to see that this task becomes more difficult as the
range of permissible transformations increases, which is the same as saying the information contained in a
report decreases. If, for example, T were any possible monotonic transformation the choice function would be
required to produce an ordering with only a small amount of information. From this perspective, the problem
with the type of ordinal structure of reports used in Arrow’s work is that the choice function is being asked to
do too much with too little information. To make this more precise, a welfare function is said to be invariant
under an acceptable transformation T , or to satisfy T if, for {x : ϕ(x) = k} we have ϕ ◦ f(x) = k¯ for all
x ∈ ϕ−1 and f ∈ T where k and k¯ may be different.
One constructive approach to the problem is to accept that we often have access to information that is more
finely grained than purely ordinal rankings. For example, we can get information on intensity of preferences
from pressure group activity, membership of organizations, protests, focus groups and the like. This means
that we can examine the welfare function over a smaller domain of transformations than that given by any
positive monotonic function ([?], 1111).
4. Utility transformations.
The transformations of utility reports that will be considered are:7
Ti. Cardinal unit and level comparability.
This is given by f(x) = (bx1 + a1, . . . , bxn + an) for 0 ≤ a, b ≤ r for r finite.
Tii. Ratio-scale non comparability.
This is given by f(x) = (b1x1, . . . , bnxn) for 0 ≤ bi ≤ r.
6More generally, any loop in Rn that only has two critical points. If a loop is entirely on a level surface it is mapped to a
point.
7These are the most important for which a welfare function exists. A much larger set has been studied in the literature ([?],
1113).
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Tiii. Ratio scale full comparability.
In this case f(x) = bx for 0 < b ≤ r.
It is worthwhile noting the following result before beginning.
Proposition. 3.The welfare function will satisfy any T = {f : f is any positive monotonic transformation of
X} and Ai −Aii if and only if ϕ ◦ f(x) = ϕ(xi) for some i.
In this case the proposition restates Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Note that this does not satisfy
anonymity.
3 Properties of the welfare function.
The first proposition says that a welfare function will satisfy Ti if it gives reports the ranking they would
be given under summation. In order to satisfy Tii the welfare function must rank reports according to their
product and Tiii is satisfied by a wider class of functions than Ti and Tii. Since the product welfare function
gives a higher ranking to egalitarian distributions of utility than the additive function a tendency towards
egalitarianism can be derived from requirements on information.
It is also asked whether a welfare function can satisfy a compensated Pareto outcome in which no-one can
be made better off under side payments by a change in the state selected. It is shown that if ϕ satisfies Ti it
satisfies this for every point on a level set. If it satisfies Tii it can satisfy this condition locally if it chooses
an egalitarian outcome.
1. Propositions on transformations.
The invariance property for the welfare function can be rewritten using Proposition 2 and the chain rule to
say that if x ∈ ϕ−1(k) it must be the case that〈
∇ϕ, ∂f
∂x
dx
〉
= 0
and this is used to prove the following propositions.
Proposition. 4. The welfare function satisfies Ai−Aiv and Ti if and only if ϕ(f) = ϕ(∑ fi).
Proof. (a). Only if. Suppose ϕ satisfies Ai−Aiv and k is not a critical value for ϕ. Then〈
∇ϕ, ∂f
∂x
dx
〉
= b(
∂ϕ
∂f1
dx1 + . . .+
∂ϕ
∂fn
dxn) = 0
It follows that the term in brackets must be zero and all ∂ϕ∂fi 6= 0 for at least one j. It is sufficient to consider
n = 2. From the implicit function theorem we have xj = g(xi) for some xj : ∂ϕ∂fj 6= 0. Hence
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dg(xi)
dxi
= − ∂ϕ/∂fi
∂ϕ/∂fj
(1)
and the derivative cannot contain any fi, fj terms. It follows that ϕ is linear in fi, fj . From the symmetry
imposed by Aii that ϕ(f1, f2) = ϕ(f1 + f2) as required.
(b). If. Suppose ϕ(
∑
xi) = k. Then 〈∇ϕ, dxi〉 = 0. It follows that
〈
∇ϕ, ∂f∂xdx
〉
= b 〈∇ϕ, dxi〉 = 0 as required.

It will be noted that the set of permissible welfare functions includes all functions of the form ϕ = (
∑
fi)k
and ϕ = e
∑
fi . In this case the next result is a little surprising. See fig. 3. for an illustration in two di-
mensional space. Consider ϕ1 and ϕ2 equivalent if whenever ϕ1(x(s)) = ϕ1(x(s′)) then ϕ2(x(s)) = ϕ2(x(s′)).
This means that ϕ1 and ϕ2 produce identical orderings.
Corollary of Proposition 4. Every welfare function that satisfies Ai − Aiv and Ti is equivalent to the
additive welfare function ϕ =
∑
xi.
Proof. Immediate from dg(xi)dxi =
∂ϕ/∂xi
∂ϕ/∂xj
and ∂ϕ∂xi = b
∂ϕ
∂
∑
fi
. Hence dg(xi)dxi = −1.

Proposition. 5. ϕ will satisfy Ai−Aiv and Tii if and only if it is equivalent to the product welfare function
Πixi.
Proof. (a). Only if. Suppose
〈
∇ϕ, ∂f∂xdx
〉
= 0 for k some n on-critical value. As before it is only necessary
to consider n = 2. Suppose ϕ is separable in fi and fj for all i, j so that Equation (??) gives
∂ϕ
∂fi
=
bi
bj
∂ϕ
∂fj
which contradicts anonymity. From Aii the only permissable non-separable welfare functions must contain a
product function h(f1f2) for h monotonically increasing.
(b). If. Suppose that we have ϕ(Πxi) = k. Then dϕ = ∂ϕ∂Πxi (
∑
Πx−idxi) = 0 where Πx−i is the product
of all terms with xi removed. This means that
∑
Πxidx−i = 0. Consider ϕ(Πbixi). In this case we have
dϕ = (Πbi) ∂ϕ∂Πbixi (
∑
Πxidx−i) = 0 as required.

Information transformations in Tiii are more restricted than those in Ti and Tii and can be satisfied by a
wider set of welfare functions.
Proposition. 6. [a] ϕ will satisfy Ai−Aiv and Tiii if and only if it satisfies Ti or is homogeneous of degree
α for α > 0.
[b] ϕ will satisfy Ai−Aiii and Tiii if and only if it satisfies Ai−Aiv or if ϕ(x) = ϕx˜ where x˜ = min or max xi ∈
x.
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Proof. [a]. (a). Only if. Suppose 〈∇ϕ ◦ f(x), dx〉 = 0. As before it is only necessary to consider n = 2. Then
the required condition is again given in Equation (??) and we also have
df2
df1
− ∂ϕ/∂f1
∂ϕ/∂f2
for ϕ(f1, f2) = a where a is a constant. This means that dx2dx1 =
dkx2
dkx1
. This equality can be used to show
that, either dx2dx1 is constant and ϕ satisfies Ti or
dx2
dx1
= h(k). From Aiii it must be the case that ∂ϕ/∂f1∂ϕ/∂f2 is
be symmetrical by interchanging f1 and f2 and hence the numerator cannot multiply the denominator by
h(k). This means that, either ∂ϕ/∂f1∂ϕ/∂f2 = c for c some constant and ϕ satisfies Ti, or from the linearity of the
derivative, ϕ is homogeneous of degree α.
(b). If. Immediate from substitution.
[b]. Immediate since min or max xi retains under Tiii. See ([?], 1116).

A function is homogeneous of degree α if ϕ(kx) = kαϕ(x). Examples of welfare functions with this property
are ϕ = x1x2 . . . xn or ϕ =
∑
(bixi)p for bi a constant. In this last case, for bi = 1 the level sets are the positive
segment of the sphere in Rn+1.
In [b] the mapping is the lexi-min or lexi-max operator, or a positional dictator, which maps into the num-
ber associated with the lowest, or highest utility report. See fig. 4. To get some idea of what is happening
note that, although it is not possible to have a person as a dictator under anonymity, it is possible to have a
position as a dictator. It will be noted that the set ϕ ∈ J that satisfy Tii and [a] includes functions that are
arbitrarily close to the lexi-min operator
2. Comparison of additive and product functions.
In order to see the difference in the orderings produced by the additive welfare function and the product
welfare function consider the manifold M associated with ϕ(
∑
xi) = k. It is straightforward to show that
|x− σ| monotonically decreases ϕ(x) for x ∈ M monotonically increases under the mapping ϕ(Πx). In other
words for a set of points that are given the same ranking under the additive function the product mapping
increases the ranking as they become more egalitarian.
3. A Utility compensated welfare functions.
Since we have some information on utilities it is reasonable to ask whether the welfare function can meet a
compensated Pareto condition which says that it should not give states of the world s and s′ equal ranking if
a shift from s to s′ makes one individual better off than it makes some individual worse off. It is obvious that
a non-linear welfare function cannot meet this condition across the whole set of reports x ∈ ϕ−1(k). It is more
interesting to ask, is there some state of the world such that no arbitrarily small change will make one individ-
ual better off than it makes another worse off by some small amount under any acceptable welfare function?
In technical terms the question becomes, is there an s such that for x(s) ∈ ϕ−1(k) there is no s′ ∈ B(s, )
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for  arbitrarily small such that for x(s′) ∈ ϕ−1(k) we have |x(s)− x(s′)| > δ for some fixed δ > 0? This gives us
Av. Local compensated Pareto principle.
Proposition. 7. It is possible to satisfy Av for every ϕ that satisfies Ti− Tiii and every fixed δ > 0 if and
only if for x(s), x(s′) ∈ ϕ−1(k) and s′ ∈ B(s, ) we have s : x(s) ∈ σ.
Proof. [a]. Immediate from the Corollary of Proposition 4.

In other words, if we wish to choose amongst states of the world with the same ranking, the states that
satisfy the local compensation principle, it is necessary to choose those that give the same utility to every
individual for reports on the scale [0,K].
4 Conclusion.
This paper has analyzed choice problems in terms of the properties of a continuous welfare function defined
on the space of utility reports. It has been shown that this gives us some insight in terms of the sets of points
that are mapped into the same value.
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